

Reducing the Fog? Immigrant Regularization and the State

YOAV H. DUMAN

University of Washington

In recent decades, the number of undocumented immigrants residing in developed countries has grown significantly. Their nebulous presence undermines states' ability to exert control over their populations and territories. In response, most host states have implemented large-scale regularizations to legalize undocumented immigrants' status. Yet we possess limited understanding of the impact these policies exert on the states themselves. This article examines the relationship between immigrant regularization, state capacity, and sovereignty. I argue that regularizations reveal a contradiction between popular images of state sovereignty and a state's actual capacity to wield authority. On one hand, regularizations facilitate the collection of information, enhancing taxation capacity, immigration control, and the rule of law. On the other, by implementing these policies, states concurrently demonstrate an inability to regulate migration and punish transgressors, thereby undermining perceptions of state sovereignty. Thus regularizations can transform states by revealing the tension between ideal images and concrete practices.

Keywords: Immigration Policy, Immigrant Regularization, the State, Sovereignty, Undocumented Immigration, Developed Countries, State Capacity, International Comparative Policy.

Related Articles:

Byrne, Jennifer, and Gregory C. Dixon. 2013. "Reevaluating American Attitudes toward Immigrants in the Twenty-First Century: The Role of a Multicreedal National Identity." *Politics & Policy* 41 (1): 83-116.

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12002/abstract>

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Gad Barzilai, Javier Crespan, Hadar Duman, Marion Duman Eilam, Stephen Hanson, Michael McCann, Luca Melchionna, Joel Migdal, and four anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank *Politics & Policy* Co-Editor in Chief, Emma Norman, for her helpful suggestions and support.

- Correa-Cabrera, Guadalupe. 2013. "Security, Migration, and the Economy in the Texas–Tamaulipas Border Region: The 'Real' Effects of Mexico's Drug War." *Politics & Policy* 41 (1): 65-82.
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12005/abstract>
- Bayes, Jane H., and Laura Gonzalez. 2011. "Globalization, Transnationalism, and Intersecting Geographies of Power: The Case of the *Consejo Consultivo del Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior* (CC-IME): A Study in Progress." *Politics & Policy* 39 (1): 11-44.
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00281.x/abstract>

Related Media:

- Papademetriou, Demetrios. 2013. "The Fundamentals of Immigration Reform." *The American Prospect*. March 12.
<http://prospect.org/article/fundamentals-immigration-reform>
- Papademetriou, Demetrios G., and Will Somerville. 2008. *Earned Amnesty: Bringing Illegal Workers Out of the Shadows*. London: Centre Forum.
<http://www.centreforum.org/assets/pubs/regularisation-web.pdf>
- Levinson, Amanda. 2005. *The Regularisation of Unauthorized Migrants Literature Survey and Country Case Studies*. Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford.
<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/reports-and-other-publications/regularisation-of-unauthorized-migrants/>
- Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP). 2013. *Undocumented Immigrant's State and Local Tax Contributions*.
<http://www.itep.org/pdf/undocumentedtaxes.pdf>

El número de inmigrantes indocumentados que residen en naciones desarrolladas ha crecido significativamente en las últimas décadas. Su presencia nebulosa subvierte la habilidad de los estados de ejercer control sobre sus poblaciones y territorios. En respuesta a lo anterior la mayoría de los estados anfitriones han implementado regularizaciones masivas para legalizar el estatus de inmigrantes indocumentados. No obstante, poseemos un entendimiento limitado del impacto que estas políticas ejercen sobre los mismos estados. Este artículo examina la relación entre regularización de inmigrantes, capacidad del estado y su soberanía. Argumento que las regularizaciones revelan una contradicción entre imágenes populares de soberanía del estado y la capacidad real del estado para ejercer su autoridad. Por un lado, las regularizaciones facilitan la recolección de información que aumenta la capacidad de los estados de ampliar su base gravable, de controlar a las poblaciones de inmigrantes y consolidar el estado de derecho. Por otro lado, al tiempo que implementan estas políticas los estados demuestran su incapacidad para regular la migración y castigar a los transgresores, lo que exhibe las limitaciones de los estados para garantizar su soberanía. Así las regularizaciones pueden transformar a los estados al revelar la tensión entre imágenes ideales y prácticas concretas.

In recent decades, the vast majority of developed countries have experienced significant increases in the number of undocumented migrants residing within their territories. Persistent structural global inequality, limited legal avenues for low-skilled migration, a steady demand for cheap and flexible labor, and the limited capacity and willingness of receiving states to maintain effective border controls have all contributed to the *irregularization of migration* (Dauvergne 2008; Engbersen, Guiraudon, and Joppke 2001). Current estimates suggest that over 40 million immigrants worldwide—illegal border crossers, visa overstayers, and failed asylum claimants—are undocumented¹ (International Council on Human Rights Policy [ICHRP] 2010).

Beyond the public backlash, it has generated throughout Europe and North America (see e.g., Doty 2003; Lahav 2004; Messina 2007), the presence of undocumented populations does in fact pose manifold practical challenges to host states' capacities to govern their societies effectively. The persistence of large populations only partially visible to states' bureaucracies and agents undermines the latter's capacity to penetrate and control society, enforce the rule of law, regulate the economy, devise social policies, and allocate resources efficiently. Simply put, "when it is no longer clear who makes up the nation, a state's internal sovereignty and the existence of the state itself is threatened" (Doty 1996, 122).

The inconspicuousness of undocumented migrants *vis-à-vis* the state, however, must not be overstated. Undocumented migrants occupy a wide array of complex statuses and positions within host states, in-between positions that are the product of the disjuncture between their legal and physical presence. On one hand, as *de facto* residents of the state, undocumented migrants consume state services (education, health, and correctional services), interact with its agents (policemen, mailmen, and educators), pay taxes, and in some cases even register with the state or local authorities. On the other, their legal exclusion concurrently produces their nonexistence (Bibler Coutin 2000). These contradictory processes render undocumented migrants simultaneously visible and invisible, thus challenging the disciplining powers of states and limiting their capacity to regulate their societies.

Due to their precarious position, undocumented migrants inevitably participate in and generate what Sciortino and Bommers (2012) have defined as *foggy social structures*. These informal structures and institutions—such as the underground labor and housing markets and unregulated social services—provide undocumented migrants with alternatives to outlets and

¹ This study uses a broad definition of undocumented migration that incorporates a host of legal categories that imply unauthorized residence and/or employment (including: failed asylum seekers, visa overstayers, illegal border crossers). While some scholars have generated typologies that differentiate between various undocumented groups based on (1) the legality of entry, (2) the legality of residence, and (3) the legality of employment (see Donato and Armenta 2011), for the purpose of this article the terms undocumented migration, irregular migration, and illegal migration are used interchangeably. For additional discussion of the concept see Dauvergne (2008), De Genova (2004, 2013), and Donato and Armenta (2011).

services from which they are excluded as a result of their (il)legal status. At times, state agents, particularly local ones, actively participate in these structures in an effort to reconcile the challenges that emanate from the contradictions between abstract immigration law and concrete bureaucratic needs (van der Leun 2003). Fog depicts the in-between position these structures occupy as neither fully visible nor invisible. Instead, they challenge the state, since they are simultaneously submerged and conspicuous, constituting what Geddes (2007, 59) calls “a ‘twilight zone’ of informality and irregularity within which many migrants exist. The point here is that irregular migration and informal employment by migrant workers are at least as much an issue of fuzzy organizational boundaries within states as of the strength of external frontier controls.” The fog does not solely hinder states’ capacity to render their territory and population legible (Scott 1998) but also generates a plurality of normative codes that undermine and challenge state sovereignty and capacity to define social rules (Merry Engel 1988).

The relation between undocumented migration and the state, however, is fraught with multiple complexities. While undocumented migration challenges states, the latter are not exogenous to the former’s creation. The very concepts of illegal migration and irregularity are legal and social constructs produced and reproduced by the state (Calavita 2005; Dauvergne 2008; De Genova 2004, 2013). In this context, De Genova (2004, 161) critiques the common reification of illegality and its perception “as a mere fact of life, the presumably transparent consequence of unauthorized border crossing or some other violation of immigration law,” perceiving it instead as a product of active state construction. Paradoxically, since states hold an exclusive prerogative to define legality, they are, in fact, largely complicit in the very production of illegality. However, this complicity does not detract from the material and practical consequences irregularity engenders, since by definition social constructions shape our collective understandings of the material world and generate real-world consequences. This article focuses on these latter consequences.

In response to the challenges undocumented migration generates, states have generally employed three strategies: deportation, toleration, and regularization. The analysis focuses on regularization, which implies the conditional provision of some form of legal status (permanent or temporary) to undocumented migrants. Despite the highly controversial nature of regularizations, they have been implemented by almost all developed migrant-receiving states (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009; Levinson 2005). However, we still lack a broad understanding of their impact and effects on the states that grant them (Finotelli 2012). Existing research has focused on their legal-institutional aspects (Apap, De Bruycker, and Schmitter 2000; Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009), economic and political conditions under which they are implemented (Chau 2001; Epstein and Weiss 2011; Maas 2005), the role of migrants and social movements in facilitating regularization (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009; Coutin 2000; Hagan 1994; Laubenthal

2007), and country-specific case studies (Levinson 2005; Miller 2002). This article sets out to bridge this gap by comparatively analyzing regularizations from the perspective of the state, assessing their efficacy as measures for reducing the fog generated by irregular immigration and examining their impact on state capacities and sovereignty.

The analysis utilizes the effects of regularizations to shed light more broadly both on the nature of the state and on sovereignty in today's era of intensified international migration. Scholars of migration politics have bemoaned the fact that the relation between immigration and the state is under-theorized (Hollifield 2008; Zolberg 1999). This study sets out to offer a modest contribution in this direction.

Studying Regularizations and the State

Regularizations afford a particularly interesting lens through which to examine the interplay between immigration and state sovereignty, given the paradox they engender. While regularizations are implemented to enhance states' capacities to penetrate and control the populations residing within their territory, their very adoption enunciates the incapacity of states to determine who is permitted to enter and reside within the national territory. This paradox has led some scholars to conclude that regularizations signify state weakness. Soysal (1994, 159) perceives regularizations as symbolizing a broader erosion of national citizenship and transgressing "the national order of things." Others have suggested that regularizations are not an efficient remedy since migrants often lapse back into irregularity (Calavita 2005), continue participating in the underground labor market (Zincone 2000), and encourage additional irregular flows (Larramona and Sanso-Navarro 2011).² Public debates regarding these policies have similarly been highly contentious (see Levinson 2005). While proponents argue that regularizations are necessary due to limited repatriation capacities, and the concurrent need to maintain social order, opponents claim that regularization undermines the rule of law as "[a]mnesty, it is argued . . . implies capitulation to those migrants who, collectively, have taken the migration process into their own hands" (Baker 1997, 9). From this perspective, regularizations constitute an acknowledgement of state weakness *vis-à-vis* unwanted immigrants since states not only condone transgressors, but also reward them.

This study transcends these debates by highlighting the relation between regularizations and state sovereignty and capacities. Building on Krasner's (1999) disaggregated conceptualization of sovereignty, I advance a nuanced understanding of the impact of regularizations on the states that implement

² Spain, for instance, was intensely criticized by its Northern European neighbors for regularizing 560,000 undocumented immigrants in 2005. Consequently, several countries, including Holland, Germany, and France, have sought to create a European Union-wide ban on mass regularizations.

them. Utilizing evidence from a wide array of cases, I argue that regularizations should not be conceptualized as a phenomenon that solely erodes or bolsters the primacy of the nation state and its sovereignty. Rather, they transform the very meaning of state sovereignty by concurrently bolstering and eroding its primacy, thereby creating a new balance between its components: the decline in one dimension does not necessarily imply the weakening of others (Rudolph 2005). While regularizations signal the limited ability of states to exercise sovereign control over their boundaries (interdependence sovereignty), they simultaneously bolster capacities to control the population residing within their territory (domestic sovereignty), and can ultimately enhance interdependence sovereign capacities as well. Thus, despite limitations, regularizations constitute a partially effective policy for countering the challenges posed by undocumented populations. *The national order of things* is reconstituted at the very moment it appears to be transgressed: when states exercise their sovereign prerogative to redefine community boundaries, they transform undocumented migrants into recognized state subjects that are susceptible to its authority and control.

I develop my argument by demonstrating how the information generated through regularizations can potentially bolster state capacities in diverse areas: the control of territorial boundaries, reassertion of the rule of law, extraction of taxes, control of the labor market, authority over and control of resident populations, and the enhancement of long-term integration processes that generate productivity gains. Additionally, regularizations reduce the administrative complexity generated by the diversity of statuses and irregularity (Kraler 2009). Regularizations can therefore render the social terrain more legible, thus bolstering state capacities and sovereignty. The degree to which regularizations fulfill these goals, however, is contingent on their design as well as on the efficient collection and utilization of information. In this sense, while regularizations might be necessary to reduce the fog, they are not sufficient.

The focus on regularization also emanates from the weakness of the alternatives: deportation and toleration. By enforcing external and internal border controls, deportation policies seek to detect and repatriate undocumented immigrants. A state's ability to implement these measures is limited due to domestic legal constraints (Ellermann 2009), logistical difficulties, and monetary considerations³ (Reyneri 2013). Furthermore, attempts to employ coercive state power to "regain control of state borders" through raids and repatriation, particularly when not coupled with policies that counter the underlying structural causes that facilitate undocumented migration, are primarily symbolic, designed to assuage public concerns, and produce limited

³ Gordon and others (2009) have estimated that, if it were logistically possible to repatriate the entire undocumented population in of the United Kingdom, the fiscal burden would amount to almost five billion British pounds.

concrete effects⁴ (Andreas 2000; Messina 2007). While all states exhibit some *de facto* toleration toward undocumented migrants, Germany and the Netherlands have both experimented with official toleration policies toward particular categories of undocumented migrants (Morris 2003). Toleration, however, offers only partial relief, since it does not permit migrants to fully emerge from the shadows (van Meeteren, Engbersen, and van San 2009). Additionally, by normalizing illegality, toleration can negatively impact the rule of law (Abella 2000). Thus Reyneri (2013, 148) concludes that regularization is “the sole policy tool which has effectively worked to drain the large pool of undocumented immigrants.”

Despite the political controversies they engender, regularizations have been broadly implemented, and their impact must not be underestimated (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009). In recent decades, Southern European countries have been at the forefront of regularization. In Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal, regularizations constitute a central policy instrument for countering underground labor markets, overcoming labor shortages, enhancing taxation, and exposing undocumented populations (Campani 2007; Maas 2005). Consequentially, over half the documented immigrants in these countries have earned their status through regularization (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009). Spain alone has regularized almost a million immigrants since 2000 (Arango and Finotelli 2009). Overall, during the last 30 years, over eight million immigrants have been regularized in the European Union and the United States by means of 34 mass regularizations.

The present analysis foregrounds a particular subset of regularizations. First, it addresses “one shot,” extraordinary regularization programs as opposed to ongoing, case-by-case regularization mechanisms, since the latter exert significantly different long-term effects (Sabater and Domingo 2012) and produce less uniform results due to their reliance on administrative discretion (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009; Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006; van Meeteren, Engbersen, and van San 2009). Second, the discussion is limited to regularization programs in highly developed countries for two reasons: (1) the dynamics of migration to developed and developing countries diverge significantly (Castles and Miller 2009); and (2) these categories of countries display pertinent differences in their capacities to exercise control and authority over their populations, and control state boundaries (Migdal 1988).

The discussion consists of four sections. The first develops the conceptual apparatus whereby I explore issues concerning regularizations and the state. The second assesses the impact of regularization programs on states’ capacities to control and maintain authority over populations residing within their

⁴ While the U.S. repatriation figures have increased by 70 percent over the last five years, over 50 percent of immigrants deported between 2009 and 2012 were legal immigrants who had been convicted of committing various felonies (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] 2012).

boundaries (domestic sovereignty). The third evaluates evidence concerning the impact of regularization on states' capacities to control their borders (interdependent sovereignty). The final section integrates the theory and evidence, suggesting a framework for understanding regularization and its effects on the state.

State Capacities and Sovereignty in a Globalizing World

Over the last 20 years, scholars have increasingly questioned states' abilities to constitute the locus of authority in world politics, concluding that the Westphalian model of sovereignty is in decline (see e.g., Jacobson 1996; Koslowski 2000; Soysal 1994). According to this post-national or globalization approach, states no longer comprise the primary organizing unit of social and political relations since their agency to devise the rules of the game has been eroded simultaneously by global and local forces. The growing influence of nonstate actors, the proliferation of human rights, the dependency on global markets, and the increasing permeability of national boundaries to the penetration of information, goods, capital, and people have contributed to the erosion of the state (Appadurai 1990; Sassen 1998). Examining national citizenship regimes, Soysal (1994, 163) argues that the state "is no longer an autonomous and independent organization closed over a nationally defined population." As a result of the heightened centrality of human rights norms, citizenship rights are being increasingly redefined as human rights, and "the individual, as an abstract, human person, supplants the national citizen" (Soysal 1994, 165). States are therefore increasingly unable to exclude noncitizens (legal or illegal) from rights that were formerly accorded solely to citizens. Along similar lines, Jacobson (1996) emphasizes international law. "The state's role and the relationship between the state and its nationals, is increasingly defined by the international order, specifically by international human rights codes and institutions" (Jacobson 1996, 77).

Opponents of these theses have argued that these conclusions overestimate the effects of the global pressures and constraints, and their impact on state capacity and autonomy (see e.g., Joppke 1999; Messina 2007). They aver that constraints are often self-imposed and represent a reconfiguration of state power rather than its decline. This *liberal state* approach suggests that many of these global trends emanate from within the state itself, and that restructuring or reducing state power is consistent with state interests. Hollifield (1992, 2008) points out that the main constraints on state autonomy *vis-à-vis* migration are endogenous to the institutions of the liberal state—the result of a commitment to market autonomy, economic integration, and independent courts (see also Hansen 2002; Joppke 1999). Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) similarly argue that domestic constraints have emerged as a means of enhancing states' overall power. Ceding and devolving power to supranational, local, and private actors

enables the prioritization of coercive power and increases the effectiveness of migration management. Thus, while post-national shifts are evident at every level of citizenship, the overall balance still favors the state as the primary unit in world politics (Bosniak 2000).

In this study, I espouse the liberal state approach as my point of departure owing to its more nuanced account of contemporary transformations in state capacities and sovereignty. Post-national approaches offer an over-determinate and unidirectional vision concerning the effects of globalization on states, overlooking both the role of state agency in facilitating and responding to these transformations, and the ongoing dialectic between global pressures and state interests. The question is whether, and to what extent, states are able to maintain their autonomy and exercise control and authority over their populations and territory. Regularizations provide an opportunity for examining these dynamics, and the findings facilitate a broader understanding concerning the national/global nexus. Before addressing the evidence, however, it is imperative to define state capacities and sovereignty.

In recent decades, social scientists have sought to identify the key dimensions of state capacities. These include, among others: resource extraction, sovereign integrity, efficient and loyal bureaucracy, coercive capacity to control society and maintain order, and institutions capable of allocating resources according to state interests (Cardenas 2010; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Migdal 1988). However, measuring these dimensions and aggregating their effects to estimate overall state capacities can prove challenging. For instance, while high taxation rates might indicate a strong extractive capacity, they could instead be attributable to other factors that make tax collection less arduous (Lieberman 2002).

The concepts of sovereignty and state capacity are closely related. Krasner (1999) differentiates between four analytically distinct attributes commonly ascribed to sovereignty. *Domestic sovereignty* refers to the ability of states to exercise authority and control over their population. *Interdependence sovereignty* concerns the capacity of states to regulate and control transborder flows. *International legal sovereignty* refers to states' mutual recognition of their sovereignty. Finally, *Westphalian sovereignty* concerns the exclusion of external actors from interfering with domestic authority. This distinction is useful for two reasons. First, it allows us to analytically distinguish between state capacity to control society by enforcing practices such as tax collection, military conscription, and legal rules on the one hand, and its capacity to control its borders on the other. Second, while domestic sovereignty is related to both authority and control, interdependence sovereignty concerns control alone. The analysis focuses primarily on the first two forms of sovereignty since they are the most pertinent to our discussion. In this respect, I diverge from Messina (2007), who argues that interdependence sovereignty constitutes the primary concern for host countries, demonstrating that domestic sovereignty constitutes an equally (if not more) crucial concern.

Migdal's (2001) *State in Society* approach can further facilitate the analysis of states' capacities to exercise these forms of sovereignty. In contrast to approaches that perceive the state as an autonomous entity that constitutes the ultimate locus of authority and control, Migdal envisages the state as one social force within a web of relations that includes multiple forces and that exercises its authority and control with varying degrees of success. Since they are neither monolithic, coherent organizations, nor organizations that are immune to penetration by other social forces, states are both internally fragmented and susceptible to social influence and competition.

In his analysis of contemporary states, Migdal proposes two levels of analysis. The first is the *image* of the state, an ideal type that projects a state of mythical qualities, as a "dominant, integrated, autonomous entity that controls [rulemaking], in a given territory" (Migdal 2001, 16). To cultivate this image, states are perceived as maintaining two boundaries: territorial boundaries, which separate one state from another; and social boundaries, which separate the state from the society it controls. This image generates a cohesive vision of the state and shapes perceptions of its character. In the context of international migration, the image of the state generates a perception of an entity that is capable of formulating coherent policies, implementing them, and maintaining its territorial integrity. The second level is that of state *practices*. At this level, the state is revealed as a partially autonomous actor embedded in a web of competing social actors in which the boundary between the state and society is often nebulous and ill defined (Migdal 2001; Mitchell 1991). Consequently, states must cooperate with social actors to compete successfully with rival codes for social organization. Furthermore, states do not possess the ostensible coherence projected by their image. Instead, social groups and state agencies compete with one another to determine policies and define rules, and follow conflicting logic and interests, often generating contradictory outcomes.

As we progress to the analysis of specific policies in immigration or otherwise, it is important to keep in mind that even when a certain degree of coherence in design and enforcement levels is achieved, the potential exists for unintended consequences as a result of the interaction between concrete social forces and policies (Andreas 2000; Cornelius 2007; Migdal 2001). For example, in response to increased border control operations along the U.S.–Mexican border during the early to mid-1990s, professional immigrant smuggling rings gained prominence, facilitating the continuation of migration flows while undermining new border control efforts.⁵ Similarly, flaws in policy

⁵ Andreas (2000) argues that while states pursue smugglers in an attempt to halt their activity, they concurrently facilitate the smugglers' operations. First, by implementing restrictive immigration laws, states generate growth in demand for smuggling services. Second, through increasing enforcement, states inadvertently facilitate the consolidation of smuggling rings and the development of more sophisticated evasion tactics, creating a peculiar dependence of the smuggling rings on the state.

design (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004), interest group politics (Freeman 1995), contradictions within the state (Calavita 1992), and persistent structural pull factors all play a role in producing suboptimal outcomes in immigration policy and its implementation.

Regularization and Domestic Sovereignty

As mentioned previously, regularizations are potentially capable of enhancing states' abilities to control their populations, extract resources, and implement the rule of law, corresponding with Krasner's (1999) concept of domestic sovereignty. This section explores the relation between regularizations and domestic sovereignty, and examines how their implementation can alter and reinforce state control and authority over its population. The potential for enhancing domestic sovereignty emanates primarily from the information-generating functions of regularizations. Legalization procedures require applicants to provide multiple forms of information that have been utilized to tackle diverse issues such as public health, taxation, crime, and labor rights. While states vary in their capacities to collect and utilize information, it remains a vital aspect of all regularization programs (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009; Jandl 2004). Thus information gathering is located at the crux of the relationship between regularization and domestic sovereignty. Here, I focus primarily on the impact of regularization programs on two aspects of domestic sovereignty: (1) legibility and population management and (2) taxation.

Legibility and Population Management

State capacities to render society legible constitute a primary component of domestic sovereignty. By definition, states possess limited information concerning the number, sociodemographic attributes, labor market participation, and spatial distribution of undocumented populations. As a consequence of the latter's submerged position, data collection is particularly challenging (Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky 1999). Demographic data, however, are a fundamental element of state control as well as a capability for efficient policy making, implementation, and resource allocation (Scott 1998). Albeit a far from perfect means of obtaining demographic information, given that a portion of the undocumented population is excluded or does not apply (Jandl 2004), regularizations significantly increase the knowledge that authorities possess regarding resident populations. Beyond the regularization-induced incentives for migrants to impart such information, legalized migrants are also more likely than undocumented ones to provide information since the latter are often reluctant to cooperate with state authority (Papademetriou, O'Neil, and Jachimowicz 2004).

There are ample empirical examples of effective information collection during regularization processes. The first regularization in Greece (1998) was primarily implemented for the purpose of gathering data concerning the demographic characteristics and labor market distribution of its foreign population for the want of alternative means of obtaining this information (OECD 2000). During the process, immigrants were also required to provide information regarding economic behavior and remittances. As a result, “Greece’s very poor statistics on immigration improved considerably due to a flow of information on applicants’ characteristics” (Fakiolas 2003a, 545). Following the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 1986 regularization in the United States, it was ascertained that official estimates pertaining to the number of undocumented immigrants were exaggerated (Jacobson 1996). Conversely, during the 2002 regularization in Italy, it transpired that the undocumented population was significantly larger than was previously thought (Calavita 2005). Regularizations in France, Spain, and Italy have all provided information concerning the length of irregular residence, immigrants’ ethnic composition, and source countries, enhancing states’ understanding of the domestic dynamics of irregular migration (Campani 2007).

While most regularizing countries collect demographic information, few have utilized it for rigorous analysis as a means of enhancing legibility. Exceptions to this are the United States and France, and more recently Spain and Italy, which have exploited regularization data to enhance immigration policy effectiveness and evaluate the performance and outcomes of regularization programs (Mármora 1999; Papademetriou, O’Neil, and Jachimowicz 2004). In France, the 1981 and 1997 regularizations were followed by multiple studies of regularized populations commissioned by the Ministry of Labor. One such study, conducted by Neyrand (2000), which included a sample of over a third of the regularized population, analyzed the socioeconomic characteristics of the beneficiaries prior to the 1997 regularization and their projected integration assistance needs. Thierry (2001) employs regularization data to analyze shifts in the dynamics of migration flows into the country as well as the efficacy of the process in reducing irregularity. In the United States, the post-IRCA *Legalized Population Surveys* provided authorities with information regarding earnings, education, mobility, and living conditions before and after regularization, and has generated a great deal of demographic and economic research (see Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2011; Borjas and Tienda 1993; Chiswick and Miller 1999). Data analysis following Italy’s 2002 regularization provided extensive information concerning labor market dynamics in addition to migrants’ spatial distribution and their living and working conditions. Furthermore, Italy’s post-regularization survey research has facilitated a comparative analysis of the economic and social integration of immigrants holding various legal statuses, including those excluded from regularization (Cesareo 2007).

Growing security concerns and securitization of migration constitute an additional factor that compounds state authorities' quest for increasing social legibility regardless of legal status (Bigo 2002; Castles and Miller 2009). Undocumented migrants pose a particular challenge since information concerning their identity and background is limited. Unlike regular migrants, who undergo selection processes and screening, undocumented immigrants by definition circumvent these procedures. Furthermore, clandestine human smuggling operations are often implicated in other forms of contraband, such as the smuggling of illicit drugs and arms (Andreas 2000). Regularization information can help create *post facto* migrant selection mechanisms for the purpose of identifying and excluding immigrants deemed undesirable—for instance, those with criminal records or various illnesses—since regularizations commonly include criminal and medical screening (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009; Magaña 2003). As a member of the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund expressed it, legalization “was a way of getting a large group of immigrants under legalized policing scrutiny” (Magaña 2003, 42).

However, there are several potential limitations. Migrants can provide incomplete or false information due to fear of negative repercussions from the state or other actors (relatives, employers, or smugglers). In Italy in 1990, many immigrants did not apply for legalization for fear that providing incriminating evidence against former employers would be detrimental to their well-being. Additionally, since employers were required to submit the applications,⁶ some mounted obstacles that rendered it impossible for their employees to apply (Reyneri 1998). Another challenge is posed by missing information as a result of the inevitable exclusion of some migrants from the process following criteria restrictions or self-selection among migrants who anticipate rejection. The latter problem is exacerbated when rejection is coupled with the threat of deportation (Papademetriou and Somerville 2008). For instance, during the 1998 Greek program, concerns over deportation led many eligible immigrants not to participate (Papantoniou-Frangouli and Leventi 2000). These limitations illustrate the discrepancy between the potential of regularizations and their implementation. While regularizations can facilitate the collection and analysis of crucial information, this outcome is contingent on policy design and implementation.

Despite these caveats, recent regularization processes suggest that learning processes have taken place. Regularizing states are increasingly successful in defining, collecting, and utilizing information to enhance population management, thereby bolstering domestic sovereignty. Qualitative and quantitative changes in the formal information requirements have boosted the effectiveness of policy designs, producing increasingly efficient outcomes.

⁶ This form of regularization, which appoints employers as intermediaries in the process, has been common in most regularization processes in Spain and Italy (Calavita 2005). Thus we should expect similar biases in both cases.

Taxation and the Underground Economy

Robust underground economies and pervasive illegal employment pose a significant challenge to state sovereignty. States have little oversight over underground economies and limited ability to tax or regulate them. In consequence, they exert a negative effect on national welfare systems and afford submerged businesses a comparative advantage over formal competitors. The challenge to welfare systems is exacerbated by the fact that workers in the underground economy, including undocumented immigrants, are often eligible for various government-funded programs such as health care and education. Underground economies undermine domestic sovereignty in at least three respects. First, they frustrate revenue extraction by the state. Second, they limit state capacity for comprehensive economic planning. Third, they generate a secondary legal code that undermines the rule of law. In other words, underground economies erode the aptitude of states to control society and implement rules. The significance of these challenges cannot be overstated, since extractive capacities “provide insight into the development of modern state capacities to wield their authority over individuals and groups within society. The ability to tax is virtually a prerequisite for governance” (Lieberman 2003, 6).

In response to these challenges, regularizations have facilitated the emergence of a significant proportion of the irregular labor force. Information has been utilized to crack down on illegal businesses, augment the tax base through the insertion of legalized workers into social security and income tax systems, and penalize delinquent employers. In this sense, regularizations are crucial for enhancing state capabilities to tax its inhabitants and monitor and regulate economic activity.

In most countries, undocumented migration and underground economies are inextricably linked, even though many native workers are also employed in the latter.⁷ Since undocumented migrants are excluded from the regular labor market, they are constrained to seek employment in the underground economy. Illegal hiring of migrants is especially prevalent in sectors such as tourism, domestic care, small industry, and agriculture (OECD 2000). The United States and Great Britain, however, are exceptions in this respect. Due to the lack of national identification cards in both countries, undocumented migrants are

⁷ In Italy, for instance, there are almost five million workers who participate in the underground economy (Morris 2002). Out of the immigrant population, over 30 percent work informally, and over 60 percent obtained their first job in the underground economy (Calavita 2005). Available data indicate that this situation is more extreme in certain industries. In the field of domestic care, which is dominated by irregular workers, there are over one million informal workers, 50 percent of whom are non-European Union immigrants. In agriculture, assessments indicate that 73-85 percent of workers are irregular. In aggregate, Italian employers save approximately 13 billion dollars a year in income and social security taxes by employing immigrants irregularly (Calavita 2005).

often employed in the formal labor market. It has therefore been estimated that federal and state governments in the United States collect over 50 percent of the direct tax potential from undocumented immigrants while partially excluding them from social services (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012).

The challenges associated with exposing the underground economy are particularly acute in countries when the latter is robust and normatively accepted, as is the case in Spain, Italy, and Greece (Castles and Miller 2009; Sassen 1999). Beyond the challenges that emanate from the submerged nature of such enterprises, many businesses function on the cusp of formality, retaining both legal and submerged employees (Morris 2002), or through partially declared positions that produce workers who are simultaneously located in the formal and the informal economies (Reyneri 1998). In response to these concerns, the 2005 Spanish regularization was publically heralded by Labor Minister Caldera as “one of the greatest processes of exposing the hidden economy in Europe in the last 40 or 50 years” (Caldera cited in Maas 2005, 6).

Information concerning the structure of the underground economy is collected in most regularization processes (Levinson 2005). However, prior to 2002, Spain and Italy experienced limited success in utilizing such information for countering the underground economy. France offers an alternative trajectory. French success derived from the coupling of regularization with increased labor enforcement (Miller 2002), triggering the contraction of the underground economy (Reyneri 2001). Thus regularizations are necessary but insufficient to counter irregularity since states must employ additional mechanisms such as worksite inspections and employer sanctions (Jahn and Straubhaar 1998). However, these mechanisms often encounter political opposition from both immigrant advocacy groups and employers (Ellermann 2009).

Recent regularizations in Italy and Spain suggest that learning processes have enhanced policy design, generating a reduction in the size of their respective underground economies. For instance, both countries have utilized regularizations to expose economic sectors located primarily underground. The domestic sector, for example, poses a particular challenge for state penetration and enforcement since workers are mostly self-employed and frequently reside with their employers, thus incurring the specific targeting of this sector for regularization. After the 2005 process, the proportion of documented immigrants in Spain reporting employment in the domestic sector increased from 1 to 22 percent in Madrid, and represented 32 percent of applicants in the entire country (Fuentes, Moreno, and Callejo 2011). The 2002 Italian regularization generated information concerning the employment distribution of undocumented migrants in the service sector (Calavita 2005), revealing that over 48 percent of those legalized were domestic workers (Cesareo 2007). As a result of continued growth in this sector, Italy announced a targeted regularization in 2009 granting legal status to an additional 270,000 domestic workers (Finotelli and Arango 2011). Domestic

workers were also targeted in the only regularization program implemented in the United Kingdom (Lenoel 2009).

While Spain's underground economy flourished long before mass immigration commenced, its persistence constituted a major pull factor for irregular migration into the country, employing over 53 percent of the migrant labor force in 2003 (Cebolla Boado and González Ferrer 2008). While previous regularizations lacked the means to effectively counter the submerged economy, the 2005 process included multiple measures to reduce incentives for illegal hiring by enhancing workplace enforcement (Barbulo 2005a) and expanding regular avenues for migrant recruitment. While these did not eliminate the submerged market, they contributed to its diminution and generated additional tax revenue. The insertion of over 95 percent of the regularized migrants into the social security system resulted in a monthly increase in social security contributions of 113.7 million euros (Barbulo 2005b), constituting a 3-percent revenue increase (Papademetriou and Somerville 2008). The regularization accounted for 44 percent of foreigners registered in the social security system in 2007, signifying an increase in the proportion of foreigners in the formal labor market from 6.14 to 9.58 percent (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales 2007). Estimates suggest that in 2006, documented immigrants' social security contributions exceeded the cost of services by 4.6 billion euros, accounting for half the social security surplus. While these figures have declined following the current economic crisis, annual surplus from immigrant contributions still exceeds 2.5 billion euros (Fuentes, Moreno, and Callejo 2011).

The 2002 regularization in Italy also enhanced employer sanctions and social security contributions by 1.8 billion euros annually (European Migration Network 2007). Similarly, the Greek regularizations of 1998 and 2002 were motivated by the prospect of extracting taxes from immigrants and employers; this prompted the government to overlook widespread public opposition to the measure (Levinson 2005). While the paucity of the available data precludes the assessment of tax revenues, existing data suggest that on average, legalized migrant tax contribution exceeds 2,500 euros annually, which is higher than the average native-born worker's contribution (Cholezas and Tsakloglou 2009).

Owing to variations in taxation mechanisms, the impact of regularizations on revenues varies across countries. Evidence from Italy, Spain, and Greece indicates that undocumented migrants pay few direct taxes and consume social services, while legalized migrants contribute to the system and consume fewer services than their average contribution. As mentioned previously, many undocumented workers in the United States are employed in the regular labor market and pay taxes (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012). A survey conducted among undocumented migrants from Mexico revealed that between 74 and 89 percent of those who consume state services pay direct taxes (Lopez, Oliphant, and Tejeda 2007). Thus future regularizations in the United States are liable to generate less short-term revenue as compared with Southern Europe since

increasing consumption of state services combines with a relatively modest growth in tax contributions.⁸

Regularizations can also produce long-term economic benefits owing to the relation among legal status on one hand, and integration, economic mobility, and educational attainment on the other (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009; Brown *et al.* 2011). Evidence suggests that documented migrants have a greater propensity for social and economic mobility and integration since regularization eliminates fear of repatriation, enhancing migrants' security and time horizons. Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzolari (2010) identify a decline in immigrant remittances following regularization as a result of increased status security, leading to a reduction in their investment in their countries of origin as a form of insurance. Legalization also enhances migrants' employment and income opportunities, particularly through inter-sectoral mobility (Andall 2006; Veiga 2007). Amuedo-Dorantes, Malo, and Munoz-Bullon (2013) posit that the 2005 process in Spain increased the likelihood of immigrant employment by 16 percent and annual earnings by approximately 13.2 percent. Using IRCA data, Rivera-Batiz (1999) suggests that legalized men and women wages increased by 15 and 21 percent, respectively. Similarly, Lynch and Oakford (2013) maintain that five years after legalization, incomes increased by 15 percent and increased by a further 10 percent following naturalization. Additionally, legalized migrants have a higher propensity to become entrepreneurs, establishing both local and transnational businesses. One indicator of increasing economic well-being and a perception of relative permanence in the host country is home ownership. Employing data from Spain, Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra (2013) demonstrate that legalization increases migrants' home ownership rates by 20 percent. Thus, regularizations can generate productivity gains by transforming immigrants into more active economic actors, increasing their earnings, skills, tax contributions, and overall benefit to national and local economies.

Regularizations have also been found to increase incentives and opportunities for investment in long-term training and education, particularly among the second generation (Council of Europe 2007). Brown and others (2011) argue that the legalization of immigrant parents has profound effects on human capital attainment of the second generation, both for those who were born in the host country and for those who immigrated as children. Their analysis demonstrates that legalization functions as a socializing mechanism, significantly affecting migrant children's use of and fluency in English as well as their educational attainment, generating long-term economic benefits. In addition, their findings suggest that parents who do not regularize transfer economic

⁸ Recent estimations suggest that a regularization in the United States would increase state and local tax revenue by two billion dollars annually, constituting a .7 percent growth from 6.3 to 7 percent of legalized families' income (ITEP 2013). The Congressional Budget Office (2006) estimated in 2006 that a regularization process could increase federal payroll tax revenues by as much as 43 billion dollars over a period of ten years.

disadvantages to the second generation. Donato and Armenta (2011) also point out that legal status grants migrants increased access to state-sponsored educational programs, local tuition rates, and funding opportunities. Furthermore, through legalization, migrants are less exposed to and reliant on illegal or submerged actors and institutions for their material survival. Thus Baker (2013) identifies a relation between immigrant legalization and a reduction in crime rates.

Despite these benefits, regularizations have also produced some unintended consequences that can potentially undermine domestic sovereignty, as exemplified by cases of fraud. The IRCA process, for instance, generated an immense professional document fraud industry that initially provided migrants with identification papers, and has since spilled over into other counterfeit activities (Magaña 2003). In other cases, criminal groups have been involved in forging labor contracts and defrauding both migrants and the state (Donaire 2013; Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky 1999). In Spain, Greece, and Italy, employers have illegally required employees to fund application expenses (Martinez Morris 2002; Veiga 2007), while others have refused to regularize their employees altogether (Papantoniou-Frangouli and Leventi 2000).

A second challenge concerns the fact that these previously discussed revenue-generating effects are transitory due to migrants' propensity to lapse into irregularity (Veiga 2007). This phenomenon is perceived as particularly acute in Southern European countries, which primarily grant temporary permits that are contingent on long-term regular employment to which migrants often have limited access (Veiga 2007). According to Calavita (2005, 43), "[t]he contingent nature of legal status is underscored by the instability inherent in the very programs designed to legalize immigrants . . . The difficulties of illegal immigrants meeting this standard . . . are legion," leading some migrants to participate in repeated regularizations (Reyneri 1998). However, not only have previous assessments overestimated the scope of status loss, but evidence suggests that recent regularizations have in fact increased prospects for status security (Reyneri 2013). For instance, evidence from Italy (2002) and Spain (2005) suggests that over 80 percent of regularized migrants have maintained legal status and employment (Arango and Finotelli 2009; Cesareo 2007). Furthermore, almost 85 percent of immigrants legalized in 2005 maintained their status five years later (Sabater and Domingo 2012), representing a 10-percent increase in status retention as compared with previous processes (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009). Spanish social security data also indicate stability in maintaining documented status among most legalized migrant groups (Fuentes, Moreno, and Callejo 2011).⁹

⁹ While these figures indicate increased capability of legalized migrants to maintain their legal status, past rates have also been as high as 75 percent (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009). Furthermore, the data on the number of immigrants who lost their status includes those who

Regularization and Interdependence Sovereignty

Capacities for interdependence sovereignty such as immigration and border control can also be affected by regularizations. Regularizations are crucial for state strategies to reassert interdependence sovereignty in the context of undocumented migration. Coercive policies such as repatriation and border control alone have proven insufficient to remedy these challenges (Andreas 2000). In the United States, bolstered border control has increased the dangers associated with border crossing, has led to the expansion of smuggling networks, and has reduced circular migration (Cornelius 2007). "The intensified border control campaign has transformed the once relatively simple illegal act of crossing the border into a system of illegal practices" (Andreas 2000, 95).

While perfect border control is quixotic, information gathered during regularizations has bolstered capacities to control immigration flows (Levinson 2005). Owing to regularization, migrants have provided information concerning smuggling rings, which account for an increasing proportion of irregular migration entering Southern Europe and approximately 77 percent of irregular migration into the United States (Carling 2007; Gathmann 2008). Information has also exposed smuggling routes and covert cooperation between smugglers and state agents, and facilitated more effective border control (Arango and Jachimowicz 2005; Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky 1999). As a consequence, the former president of Spain's Criminal High Court called for special mechanisms to regularize undocumented immigrants who provide information concerning the personnel and practices of smuggling rings (Granda 2008). In 2002, Greece included special provisions for immigrants who furnished information concerning human smuggling and sex trafficking operations (Fakiolas 2003b). Similarly, the 1996 Italian regularization revealed that many migrants were smuggled through France rather than via the maritime Mediterranean border (Reyneri 2001).

By depleting the size of undocumented populations, regularizations can also increase the efficacy of state controls over undocumented immigration. Repeated regularizations in Italy and Spain have significantly decreased the size of undocumented populations in both countries (Cesareo 2007). These reductions afford a clearer terrain to identify transgressors and allocate resources more efficiently. Additionally, the information gathered can reveal actual labor market demand, thereby facilitating the creation of migration policies that are more attuned to that demand (Morris 2003). Regularizations, therefore, can function as a corrective mechanism that permits both retroactive adjustments and enhances future migration policy design.

emigrated after being regularized, and therefore overestimate the propensity to fall back into an irregular situation.

Some scholars have raised concerns that regularizations actually increase, rather than decrease, rates of undocumented migration, creating a pull factor by generating incentives for additional migration in anticipation of legalization (Boswell 2003; Cesareo 2007), while others are more skeptical regarding the generalizability of such effects (Arango and Finotelli 2009; Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009). Evidence with regard to this hypothesis is mixed. Baganha (2007) found that 13 percent of immigrants to Portugal were motivated by the prospect of future regularization. Similarly, regularizations in France (1982) and Italy (1996) resulted in increased irregular flows (Jandl 2004; Meissner, North, and Papademetriou 1987). Other cases, however, lend little support to this hypothesis. The IRCA process reduced irregular flows for several years (Magaña 2003). Border apprehension data indicate that there was an almost 50 percent decline in detentions between 1986 and 1989 despite the massive increase in Immigration and Naturalization Service staffing (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012). Larramona and Sanso-Navarro (2011) have recently argued that irregular flows increased by 8 percent following the 2005 Spanish regularization. However, Arango and Finotelli (2009) suggest that the apparent increase was the result of shifts in smuggling routes due to border control and bilateral agreements, and does not indicate an absolute increase in flows. Furthermore, shifting rates of undocumented migration do not correlate with the implementation of regularizations. For instance, despite the fact that there was no prospect of a second regularization in the mid-to-late 1990s in the United States, illegal immigration persisted and increased (OECD 2000).

Increasing migratory flows are primarily the consequence of labor market demand, as the recent decline in undocumented migration to both Southern Europe and the United States suggests (Papademetriou 2013). Thus regularizations can be expected to generate additional undocumented migration when not parceled with measures that counter the core structural pull factors, and create adequate avenues for migrant recruitment. Early regularizations in Southern Europe therefore generated additional irregularity because they did not tackle persistent pull factors such as robust informal economies and inadequate hiring norms, nor did they provide solutions for the demand for migrant labor (Reyneri 1998).

Regularizations thus constitute a necessary but insufficient condition for bolstering interdependence sovereignty. The efficacy of regularization is contingent both on program design and on the capacity of the state to utilize the information gathered to enhance control and create migration policies that are more attuned to real market demands. Italy, Spain, and Greece in the 1990s constitute instances of states that were ineffective in achieving these goals (Boswell 2003), thus effecting the normalization of regularization as a substitute for an active immigration policy (Finotelli 2012). Yet the recent evidence presented earlier suggests that learning processes have occurred. Through regularizations, states have reduced undocumented populations, enhanced internal and external control, devised more effective immigration policies, and

cracked down on smuggling rings. While regularizations do not furnish a perfect prescription for migration management, they *can* empower states to bolster control and reduce the discrepancy between their image and practices.

Conclusions: Bringing the State Back In?

This article has argued that regularizations do not necessarily weaken the state, as their opponents assert. In many ways, they have the potential to strengthen and reconstitute it. Doty (2003, 89) notes that the “passage of some form of amnesty does not mean an end to reterritorializing practices. Indeed, amnesties could be considered a form of reterritorializing itself.” Similarly, Jacobson (1996, 43) posits that the “IRCA is significant because it illustrates an attempt—indeed *the* major attempt—to assert the American sovereignty in the face of external events and pressures.”¹⁰ It is thus intriguing that many proponents of regularizations envision a borderless world, while their opponents perceive themselves as committed to the integrity of the state. This is a consequence of what can be described as “the paradox of regularizations.” The policy, which seems to epitomize the erosion of the nation state, simultaneously recasts it as sovereign by bolstering its capacities and incorporating formerly (partially) invisible subjects into its sphere of authority and control. While regularizations ostensibly hinder the rule of law, they concurrently enable states to reinforce it; what appears to be a weakening of the state simultaneously reconstitutes the national order of things.

Migdal (2004, 3) points out that since the end of the Cold War, “borders are much more commonly understood as contingent, porous and in flux.” In today’s post-modern world, the image of bounded, self-contained states is in decline. The rapid global movement of ideas, people, and capital that permeates borders, coupled with the bolstering of human rights regimes, renders this vision of a coherent and bounded state increasingly difficult to sustain. These processes are not only eroding the territorial integrity of the state but also the communities of belonging that are constituted by its boundaries (Jacobson 1996; Migdal 2004). Regularization programs, however, require that we reevaluate our theoretical understanding of the role of the state in an era of intensified international migration and globalization. In this context, state agency is revealed, actively seeking to reassert control when it is threatened or undermined. In this respect, regularizations enable states to enhance the legibility of the populations they govern and to re-establish authority approximating the high modernist ideal of bounded nation states by inserting undocumented migrants into the state’s sphere of authority and control. Yet these very processes also have a transformative impact on the states that implement them.

¹⁰ While these authors hint at the main arguments presented in this article, they do so tangentially and do not systematically develop their insights concerning regularization.

If we return to the distinction between the state's image and practices, a revealing dynamic emerges. On one hand, regularizations can bolster state capacities to assert both domestic and interdependence sovereignty. On the other hand, as their imperfect capacity to realize their image is exposed, their very implementation undermines and alters the state's image. While these processes seem contradictory, they are in fact complementary. This double movement in which the state's image is recast in a more realistic manner, while practices are bolstered, engenders a more balanced relation between states' images and practices—one that better reflects the complexities in which real world states are embedded. Sassen (1998) is correct in asserting that while states have changed, their significance has not declined. In this context, regularizations do not solely weaken or strengthen states, but transform them instead, generating a reconfiguration of sovereignty and forging a new equilibrium between its components.

About the Author

Yoav H. Duman is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington and a Schusterman Israel studies scholar. His research interests include the politics of immigration and citizenship, nation building and language policies in plurinational societies, norms and legitimacy in international conflict, and Israeli politics. He is currently completing his dissertation that examines immigration and incorporation policies in divided societies.

References

- ABELLA, MANOLO. 2000. "Migration and Employment of Undocumented Workers: Do Sanctions and Amnesties Work?" In *Irregular Migration: Dynamics, Impact, Policy Options*, edited by Dilek Cinar, August Gachter, and Harald Waldrach. Vienna: European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research. 205-216.
- AMUEDO-DORANTES, CATALINA, and CYNTHIA BANSACK. 2011. "The Impact of Amnesty on Labor Market Outcomes: A Panel Study Using the Legalized Population Survey." *Industrial Relations* 50 (3): 443-471. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-232X.2011.00642.x/full>
- AMUEDO-DORANTES, CATALINA, MIGUEL MALO, and FERNANDO MUNOZ-BULLON. 2013. "New Evidence on the Impact of Legal Status on Immigrant Labor Market Performance: The Spanish Case." *Labour* 27 (1): 93-113. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/labr.12002/full>

AMUEDO-DORANTES, CATALINA, and FRANCESCA MAZZOLARI. 2010. "Remittances to Latin America from Migrants in the United States: Assessing the Impact of Amnesty Programs." *Journal of Development Economics* 91 (2): 323-335. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387809000650>

AMUEDO-DORANTES, CATALINA, and KUSUM MUNDRA. 2013. "Immigrant Homeownership and Immigration Status: Evidence from Spain." *Review of International Economics* 21 (2): 204-218. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/roie.12031/full>

ANDALL, JACQUELINE. 2006. "Migration Mobility in European Diasporic Space." In *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, edited by Craig Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 276-299.

ANDREAS, PETER. 2000. *Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

APAP, JOANNA, PHILIPPE DE BRUYCKER, and CATHERINE SCHMITTER. 2000. "Regularisation of Illegal Aliens in the European Union. Summary Report of a Comparative Study." *European Journal of Migration & Law* 2 (3/4): 263-308. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ejml2&div=25&id=&page=>

APPADURAI, ARJUN. 1990. "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy." *Public Culture* 2 (2): 1-24. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://publicculture.dukejournals.org/content/2/2/1.citation>

ARANGO, JOAQUÍN, and CLAUDIA FINOTELLI. 2009. "Spain." In *REGINE—Regularisations in Europe*, edited by Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Albert Kraler. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 443-458.

ARANGO, JOAQUÍN, and MAIA JACHIMOWICZ. 2005. "Regularizing Immigrants in Spain: A New Approach." *Migration Information Source*. September 1. <http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=331>

BAGANHA, MARIA. 2007. "The Migration Industry: A Case Study." In *Irregular Migration, Informal Labour and Community: A Challenge for Europe*, edited by Erik Berggren, Branka Likic-Brboric, Gulay Toksöz, and Nikos Trimikliniotis. Maastricht: Shaker Publishing. 95-103.

BAKER, SCOTT. 2013. "Effects of Immigrant Legalization on Crime: The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act." *Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper Series* 12-012. Accessed on April 1, 2013. Available online at <http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/RePEc/sip/12-012.pdf>

BAKER, SUSAN GONZALES. 1997. "The 'Amnesty' Aftermath: Current Policy Issues Stemming from the Legalization Programs of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act." *The International Migration Review* 31 (1): 5-27. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.jstor.org/offcampus.lib.washington.edu/stable/2547255>

BALDWIN-EDWARDS, MARTIN, and ALBERT KRALER. 2009. *REGINE—Regularisations in Europe*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

BARBULO, TOMAS. 2005a. "Trabajo Deberá Hacer Cada Día 3.000 Inspecciones tras La Regularización." *El Pais*. March 31. Accessed on March 3, 2012. Available online at http://elpais.com/diario/2005/03/31/espana/1112220023_850215.html

_____. 2005b. "La Regularización Ya Ha Convertido en Cotizantes a 500.000 Inmigrantes." *El Pais*. September 23. Accessed on March 10, 2012. Available online at http://elpais.com/diario/2005/09/23/espana/1127426423_850215.html

BIGO, DIDIER. 2002. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27: 63-92. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at http://alt.sagepub.com/content/27/1_suppl/63.short

BORJAS, GEORGE, and MARTA TIENDA. 1993. "The Employment and Wages of Legalized Immigrants." *The International Migration Review* 27 (4): 712-747. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2546910>

BOSNIAK, LINDA. 2000. "Citizenship Denationalized." *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 7 (2): 447-509. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ijgls7&div=24&id=&page=>

BOSWELL, CHRISTINA. 2003. *European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion*. Oxford: Blackwell.

BROWN, SUSAN K., FRANK D. BEAN, MARK A. LEACH, and RUBEN G. RUMBAUT. 2011. "Legalization and Naturalization Trajectories among Mexican Immigrants and Their Implications for the Second Generation." In *The Next Generation: Immigrant Youth in a Comparative Perspective*, edited by Richard Alba and Mary C. Waters. New York and London: New York University Press. 31-45.

CALAVITA, KITTY. 1992. *Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S.* New York: Routledge.

_____. 2005. *Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race, and Exclusion in Southern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- CAMPANI, GIOVANNA. 2007. "Irregular Migration and Trafficking: Controversial Concepts and Changing Contexts in Southern Europe." In *Irregular Migration, Informal Labour and Community: A Challenge for Europe*, edited by Erik Berggren, Branka Likic-Brboric, Gulay Toksöz, and Nikos Trimikliniotis. Maastricht: Shaker Publishing. 66-84.
- CARDENAS, MAURICIO. 2010. "State Capacity in Latin America." *Economia* 2010 (2): 1-45. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/economia/v010/10.2.cardenas.html>
- CARLING, JØRGEN. 2007. "Migration Control and Migrant Fatalities at the Spanish-African Borders." *International Migration Review* 41 (2): 316-343. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00070.x/full>
- CASTLES, STEPHEN, and MARK J. MILLER. 2009. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: Guilford Press.
- CEBOLLA BOADO, HÉCTOR, and AMPARO GONZÁLEZ FERRER. 2008. *La Inmigración En España 2000-2007: De La Gestión De Flujos a La Integración De Los Inmigrantes*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
- CESAREO, VINCENZO. 2007. *Immigrants Regularization Processes in Italy: Analysis of an Emblematic Case*. Rome: Polimetrica.
- CHAU, NANCY H. 2001. "Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration Reform." *Journal of Labor Economics* 19 (3): 604-634. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/322075>
- CHISWICK, BARRY, and PAUL W. MILLER. 1999. "Language Skills and Earnings among Legalized Aliens." *Journal of Population Economics* 12 (1): 63-89. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s001480050091>
- CHOLEZAS, IOANNIS, and PANOS TSAKLOGLOU. 2009. "The Economic Impact of Immigration in Greece: Taking Stock of the Existing Evidence." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 9 (1-2): 77-104. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683850902723439>
- CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. 2006. *Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006*. Accessed on June 30, 2013. Available online at <http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/75xx/doc7501/s2611spass.pdf>
- CORNELIUS, WAYNE. 2007. "Introduction: Does Border Enforcement Deter Unauthorized Migration." In *Impacts of Border Enforcement on Mexican Migration: The View from Sending Communities*, edited by Wayne. A. Cornelius and Jessa M. Lewis. La Jolla: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. 1-16.

CORNELIUS, WAYNE, and TAKEYUKI TSUDA. 2004. "Controlling Immigration: The Limits of Government Intervention." In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, edited by Wayne Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 3-48.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE. 2007. *Regularisation Programmes for Irregular Migrants*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Accessed on March 1, 2012. Available online at <http://www.unhcr.org/4b9fac519.pdf>

COUTIN, SUSAN BIBLER. 2000. *Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants' Struggle for U.S. Residency*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

DAUVERGNE, CATHERINE. 2008. *Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

DE GENOVA, NICHOLAS. 2004. "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality.'" *Latino Studies* 2 (2): 160-185. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/pal/lst/2004/00000002/00000002/art00003>

_____. 2013. "Spectacles of Migrant 'Illegality': The Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of Inclusion." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36 (7): 1-19. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.2013.783710>

DONAIRE, GINES. 2013. "Detenidas Cuatro Personas Que Vendían Falsos Contratos Inmigrantes." *El Pais*. March 7. Accessed on March 10, 2013. Available online at http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/03/07/andalucia/1362673142_070508.html

DONATO, KATHARINE M., and AMADA ARMENTA. 2011. "What We Know about Unauthorized Migration." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37: 529-543. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-soc-081309-150216>

DOTY, ROXANNE LYNN. 1996. "Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity." In *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 121-147.

_____. 2003. *Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies: Statecraft, Desire and the Politics of Exclusion*. London and New York: Routledge.

ELLERMANN, ANTJE. 2009. *States against Migrants: Deportation in Germany and the United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

ENGBERSEN, GODFRIED, VIRGINIE GUIRAUDON, and CHRISTIAN JOPPKE. 2001. "The Unanticipated Consequences of Panopticon Europe." In *Controlling a New Migration World*, edited by Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke. London: Routledge. 222-246.

EPSTEIN, GIL, and AVI WEISS. 2011. "The Why, When, and How of Immigration Amnesties." *Journal of Population Economics* 24: 285-316. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00148-009-0280-5>.

EUROPEAN MIGRATION NETWORK. 2007. *Illegally Resident Third Country Nationals in Italy: State Approaches Towards Them and Their Profile and Social Situation*. Accessed on January 8, 2010. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/immigration/pdf/general/emn_synthesis_report_illegal_immigration_final_january_2007.pdf

EVANS, PETER, DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, and THEDA SKOCPOL. 1985. *Bringing the State Back In*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

FAKIOLAS, ROSSETOS. 2003a. "Regularising Undocumented Immigrants in Greece: Procedures and Effects." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 29 (3): 535-561. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13691830305614#.Us2IVxZAtcE>

_____. 2003b. "The Second Legalization of the Illegal Immigrants in Greece." *The International Migration Review* 37 (4): 1292-1302. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00179.x/abstract>

FINOTELLI, CLAUDIA. 2012. "What Can Be Learned from Spain. The Outcomes of the Regularisation Process of 2005." In *Foggy Social Structures*, edited by Giuseppe Sciortino and Michael Bommers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 189-212.

FINOTELLI, CLAUDIA, and JOAQUÍN ARANGO. 2011. "Regularisation of Unauthorised Immigrants in Italy and Spain: Determinants and Effects." *Documents d'Anàlisi Geogràfica* 57 (3): 495-515. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.raco.cat/index.php/DocumentsAnalisi/article/viewArticle/248439/0>

FREEMAN, GARY P. 1995. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States." *The International Migration Review* 29 (4): 881-913. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2547729>

FUENTES, FRANCISCO, JAVIER MORENO, and MARÍA BRUQUETAS CALLEJO. 2011. *Immigration and the Welfare State in Spain*. Barcelona: La Caixa Welfare Projects. Accessed on January 10, 2012. Available online at http://www.publicacionestecnicas.com/lacaixa/inmigracion/31_eng.html

GATHMANN, CHRISTINA. 2008. "Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from Migrant Smuggling along the Southwestern Border." *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (10): 1926-1941. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272708000674>

GEDDES, ANDREW. 2007. "The Europeanization of What? Migration, Asylum and the Politics of European Integration." In *Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration between Autonomy and the European Union*, edited by Thomas Faist and Andreas Ette. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. 49-71.

GORDON, IAN, KATHLEEN SCANLON, TONY TRAVERS, and CHRISTINE WHITEHEAD. 2009. *Economic Impact on the London and UK Economy of an Earned Regularisation of Irregular Migrants to the UK*. London: London Development Agency. Accessed on January 10, 2012. Available online at http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/economic_unit/docs/irregular-migrants-report.pdf

GRANDA, ELSA. 2008. "La Audiencia Nacional Quiere Investigar y Juzgar a Las Mafias De Inmigración." *El Pais*. May 26. Accessed on June 1, 2008. Available online at http://elpais.com/diario/2008/05/26/espana/1211752809_850215.html

GUIRAUDON, VIRGINIE, and GALLYA LAHAV. 2000. "A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (2): 163-195. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/33/2/163.abstract>

HAGAN, JACQUELINE MARIA. 1994. *Deciding to Be Legal: A Maya Community in Houston*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

HANSEN, RANDALL. 2002. "Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrants to Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (3): 259-283. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/35/3/259.abstract>

HOLLIFIELD, JAMES F. 1992. *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

_____. 2008. "The Politics of International Migration. How Can We 'Bring the State Back In.' " In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, edited by Caroline Brettell and James Hollifield. New York: Routledge. 137-185.

INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY (ITEP). 2013. "Undocumented Immigrant's State and Local Tax Contributions." Accessed on June 30, 2013. Available online at <http://www.itep.org/pdf/undocumentedtaxes.pdf>

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY (ICHRP). 2010. *Irregular Migration, Migrant Smuggling and Human Rights: Towards Coherence*. Geneva: ICHRP. Accessed on February 13, 2014. Available online at http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/56/122_report_en.pdf

JACOBSON, DAVID. 1996. *Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- JAHN, ANDREAS, and THOMAS STRAUBHAAR. 1998. "A Survey of the Economics of Illegal Migration." *South European Society and Politics* 3 (3): 16-42. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608740308539546#.Us2pjRZAteE>
- JANDL, MICHAEL. 2004. "The Estimation of Illegal Migration in Europe." *Migration Studies* 153: 141-156. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at http://internazionali.ulss20.verona.it/docs/projects/here/inventory/LITERATURE/European/The_Estimation_of_illegal_immigration_in_Europe.pdf
- JOPPE, CHRISTIAN. 1999. *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- KOSLOWSKI, RAY. 2000. *Migrants and Citizens: Demographic Change in the European State System*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- KRALER, ALBERT. 2009. *Regularisation—A Misguided Option or Part and Parcel of a Comprehensive Policy Response to Irregular Migration*. International Migration, Integration, and Social Cohesion Working Paper No. 24. Accessed on June 10, 2010. Available online at <http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=138178>
- KRASNER, STEPHEN D. 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- LAHAV, GALLYA. 2004. *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- LARRAMONA, GEMMA, and MARCOS SANOS-NAVARRO. 2011. "Do Regularization Programs of Illegal Immigrants Have a Magnet Effect? Evidence from Spain." Accessed on May 10, 2012. Available online at http://cream.conference-services.net/resources/952/3365/pdf/MGDNF2013_0048.pdf
- LAUBENTHAL, BARBARA. 2007. "The Emergence of Pro-Regularization Movements in Western Europe." *International Migration* 45 (3): 101-133. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2007.00412.x/abstract>
- LAZARIDIS, GABRIELLA, and JOANNA POYAGO-THEOTOKY. 1999. "Undocumented Migrants in Greece: Issues of Regularization." *International Migration* 37 (4): 715-740. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2435.00091/pdf>
- LENOEL AUDREY. 2009. "United Kingdom." In *REGINE—Regularisations in Europe*, edited by Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Albert Kraler. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 475-502.

LEVINSON, AMANDA. 2005. *The Regularisation of Unauthorized Migrants Literature Survey and Country Case Studies*. Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford. Accessed on April 17, 2008. Available online at <http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/reports-and-other-publications/regularisation-of-unauthorized-migrants/>

LIEBERMAN, EVAN S. 2002. "Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations: Possibilities and Pitfalls in Cross-National Research." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (4): 89-115. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02686334>

_____. 2003. *Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

LOPEZ, HENRY, ROB OLIPHANT, and EDITH TEJEDA. 2007. "US Settlement Behavior and Labor Market Participation." In *Impacts of Border Enforcement on Mexican Migration: The View from Sending Communities*, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius and Jessa M. Lewis. La Jolla: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. 75-96.

LYNCH, ROBERT, and PATRICK OAKFORD. 2013. "The Economic Effects of Granting Legal Status and Citizenship to Undocumented Immigrants." *Washington: Center for American Progress*. Accessed on February 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2013/03/20/57351/the-economic-effects-of-granting-legal-status-and-citizenship-to-undocumented-immigrants/>

MAAS, WILLEM. 2005. "Explaining Amnesty: Why States Legalize Illegal Migrants." Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC. September 1. Accessed on December 11, 2011. Available online at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/4/0/5/3/pages40530/p40530.php

MAGAÑA, LISA. 2003. *Straddling the Border: Immigration Policy and the INS*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

MÁRMORA, LELIO. 1999. *International Migration Policies and Programs*. Geneva: International Organization of Migration.

MEISSNER, DORIS, DAVID NORTH, and DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU. 1987. "Legalization of Undocumented Aliens: Lessons from Other Countries." *International Migration Review* 21 (2): 424-432. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2546325>

MERRY ENGEL, SALLY E. 1988. "Legal Pluralism." *Law & Society Review* 22 (5): 869-896. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3053638>

MESSINA, ANTHONY M. 2007. *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

MIGDAL, JOEL S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_____. 2001. *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2004. "Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints. Struggles to Construct and Maintain State and Social Boundaries." In *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices*, edited by Joel S. Migdal. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3-23.

MILLER, MARK J. 2002. "Continuity and Change in Postwar French Legalization Policy." In *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in a New Century*, edited by Anthony M. Messina. Westport: Paeger. 13-32.

MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO Y ASUNTOS SOCIALES. 2007. *Boletín De Estadísticas Laborales, Ministerio De Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 1999–2006*. Madrid: Gobierno de España.

MITCHELL, TIMOTHY. 1991. "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics." *The American Political Science Review* 85: 77-96. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962879>

MORRIS, LYDIA. 2002. *Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants' Rights*. New York: Routledge.

_____. 2003. "Managing Contradiction: Civic Stratification and Migrants' Rights." *International Migration Review* 37 (1): 74-100. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00130.x/abstract>

NEYRAND, GÉRARD. 2000. "Le Suivi Social des Étrangers Régularisés au Titre de la Circulaire du 24 Juin 1997." *Migrations Etudes* 92: 1-8. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://portail.documentation.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/crdaln/document.xsp?id=Cdu-0086362>

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD). 2000. *Trends in International Migration: Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI): Annual Report 2000*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

ORRENIUS, PIA M., and MADELINE ZAVODNY. 2012. "The Economic Consequences of Amnesty for Unauthorized Immigrants." *CATO Journal* 32 (1): 85-106. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/catoj32&div=10&g_sent=1&collection=journals#87

PAPADEMETRIOU, DEMETRIOS. 2013. "The Fundamentals of Immigration Reform." *The American Prospect*. March 12. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://prospect.org/article/fundamentals-immigration-reform>

PAPADEMETRIOU, DEMETRIOS, KEVIN O'NEIL, and MAIA JACHIMOWICZ. 2004. *Observations on Regularization and the Labor Market Performance of Unauthorized and Regularized Immigrants*. Hamburg: Migration Research Group. Accessed on December 20, 2012. Available online at http://www.fil.pt/irj/go/km/docs/aip/documentos/estudos%20publicacoes/centro%20documentacao/Capital%20Humano/I.Livre_Circulacao_Trabalhadores/A2.i.Mobilidade_Laboral/Regularization_%20and_labour_performance.pdf

PAPADEMETRIOU, DEMETRIOS G., and WILL SOMERVILLE. 2008. *Earned Amnesty: Bringing Illegal Workers Out of the Shadows*. London: Centre Forum. Accessed on December 20, 2012. Available online at <http://www.centreforum.org/assets/pubs/regularisation-web.pdf>

PAPANTONIOU-FRANGOULI, MARIA, and KLEIO M. LEVENTI. 2000. "The Legalization of Aliens in Greece." *International Migration Review* 34 (3): 950-955. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2675950>

REYNERI, EMILIO. 1998. "The Mass Legalization of Migrants in Italy: Permanent or Temporary Emergence from the Underground Economy?" *South European Society and Politics* 3 (3): 83-104. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608740308539548>

_____. 2001. *Migrants' Involvement in Irregular Employment in the Mediterranean Countries of the European Union*. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Accessed on December 20, 2012. Available online at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_protect/-protrav/-migrant/documents/publication/wcms_201875.pdf

_____. 2013. "Irregular Immigration and the Underground Economy in Southern Europe: Breaking the Vicious Cycle." In *Europe's Immigration Challenge: Reconciling Work, Welfare and Mobility*, edited by Grete Brochmann and Elena Jurado. London: I. B. Tauris. 143-158.

RIVERA-BATIZ, FRANCISCO. 1999. "Undocumented Workers in the Labor Market: An Analysis of the Earnings of Legal and Illegal Mexican Immigrants in the United States." *Journal of Population Economics* 12 (1): 91-116. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s001480050092>

RUDOLPH, CHRISTOPHER. 2005. "Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age." *International Studies Review* 7: 1-20. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2005.00455.x/full>

SABATER, ALBERT, and ANDREU DOMINGO. 2012. "A New Immigration Regularization Policy: The Settlement Program in Spain." *International Migration Review* 46 (1): 191-220. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2012.00884.x/full>

SASSEN, SASKIA. 1998. *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money*. New York: New Press.

____. 1999. *Guests and Aliens*. New York: The New Press.

SCHIERUP, CARL-ULRIK, PEO HANSEN, and STEPHEN CASTLES. 2006. *Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: A European Dilemma*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

SCIORTINO, GIUSEPPE, and MICHAEL BOMMES. 2012. *Foggy Social Structures: Irregular Migration, European Labour Markets and the Welfare State*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

SCOTT, JAMES C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

SOYSAL, YASEMIN. 1994. *The Limits of Citizenship*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

THIERRY, XAVIER. 2001. "Les Entrées d'Étrangers en France de 1994 à 1999." *Population (French Edition)* 56 (3): 423-450. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/pop_0032-4663_2001_num_56_3_7274

US IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE). 2012. *2012 ICE Immigration Removals: ERO Annual Report*. Washington: Government Printing Office.

VAN DER LEUN, JOANNE. 2003. *Looking for Loopholes: Processes of Incorporation of Illegal Immigrants in the Netherlands*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

VAN MEETEREN, MASJA, GODFRIED ENGBERSEN, and MARION VAN SAN. 2009. "Striving for a Better Position: Aspirations and the Role of Cultural, Economic, and Social Capital for Irregular Migrants in Belgium." *International Migration Review* 43 (4): 881-907. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00788.x/full>

VEIGA, UBLADO M. 2007. "Irregular Migration, Informal Labour and Poverty in the Agricultural Sector in Spain." In *Irregular Migration, Informal Labour and Community: A Challenge for Europe*, edited by Erik Berggren, Branka Likic-Brboric, Gulay Toksöz, and Nikos Trimikliniotis. Maastricht: Shaker Publishing. 184-199.

ZINCONI, GIOVANNA. 2000. "A Model of "Reasonable Integration:" Summary of the First Report on Integration of Immigrants in Italy." *International Migration Review* 34 (3): 956-968. Accessed on January 13, 2014. Available online at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2675951>

ZOLBERG, ARISTIDE. 1999. "Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy." In *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience*, edited by Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 71-93.