Everyone heard the condemnation. Who actually changed?
Created by Yoav Duman
How the studies meet
The studies begin with different political decisions. Bassan-Nygate asks how citizens judge their own government after it criticizes abuses abroad. Morse and Pratt ask whether an accused government's reply changes people's support for punishment. Those reactions could occur during the same dispute, but the researchers did not test one complete exchange between Q and R. To understand whether detainees were helped, you would also need evidence about what governments actually did.
Article A
How Does Shaming Human Rights Violators Abroad Shape Attitudes at Home?
Lotem Bassan-Nygate British Journal of Political Science · 55:e4 · DOI 10.1017/S0007123424000267
Citizens can approve of their government's response to abuses abroad even when those abuses continue.
The question and the explanation
Why would a government condemn abuse in another country if the criticism does not stop it? Bassan-Nygate examines a possible benefit at home. Naming and shaming means publicly identifying alleged wrongdoing and urging change. Citizens may take that criticism as a sign that their own government values rights. They may also see it as a display of power: their government appears able to challenge another state and influence its behavior. The proposed processes run from the public statement to impressions of morality or power, and then to approval of the government's response.
There is another plausible explanation for approval: citizens may believe the criticism helped victims. To separate these explanations, the study tells every participant that the foreign government's abuses continue. The researchers can then ask whether speaking out changes judgments even when the account contains no improvement abroad.
What the researchers compared
In March and June 2022, the researcher surveyed 1,200 and 3,000 attentive US respondents through Lucid. Respondents were recruited to resemble the population in sex, age, race, and region; this does not give every American the same chance of selection. Chance determined which version of a hypothetical incident each person read. One mentioned US condemnation at the UN; the other did not. Both said that foreign abuses continued. The second experiment also varied whether the foreign country was a US ally.
Participants then rated how the US government handled the situation, how much it valued and respected rights, and their own support for or opposition to torture in the US. The first experiment also asked how moral and powerful the US government in the story seemed. These questions explore possible pathways from condemnation to approval. Because chance assigned the messages, the groups should tend to be similar before reading them. Comparing their answers helps estimate a message effect. The approval question concerned this incident, rather than overall government popularity or voting.
What they found and what it means
People who learned about condemnation gave higher approval to the US government's handling of the incident and judged it more favorably on respect for rights. In the first experiment, condemnation also increased impressions of US morality and power. Since continued abuse appeared in both accounts, this domestic benefit did not depend on learning that the foreign government had improved. The result helps explain why leaders might gain credit for speaking out before they secure a change abroad.
The evidence for reduced opposition to torture was smaller and depended on circumstances. The author discusses moral licensing: a favorable moral impression can make people more willing to excuse other troubling conduct. That is a proposed explanation of an attitude pattern, rather than proof that condemnation causes actual abuse.
Where the conclusion stops
The experiment identifies a message effect, but does not establish every step in the proposed processes. Perceptions of morality and power were measured, not separately assigned by chance, so they do not by themselves prove which impression caused approval to change. Nor do these answers establish leaders' motives, improved rights practices, or how people would respond to a real dispute. A controlled account gives everyone clear information; real audiences may encounter conflicting reports or never hear the statement.
Study details and evidence anchors
Who answered?
US survey respondents read a hypothetical incident involving their own government's response to a foreign government's abuses.
What was compared?
Chance determined whether the account mentioned US condemnation. Both versions said that foreign abuses continued, so the comparison did not vary whether victims were helped.
What was measured?
Respondents evaluated the US government's handling of the incident and its respect for rights. They also stated their views about torture in the US. The first experiment also assessed impressions of US morality and power.
What remains unknown?
These answers do not reveal why officials chose to condemn, whether they adopted new policies, or whether abuses later changed.
Source guide: research design, experiments 1–2, and conclusion. Published article pp. 1–19.
Read first: Begin with the explanation here. In the full article, read the research design and conclusion, then ask why continued abuses appear in both versions of the incident.
Open-access publisher full text. No instructor login is needed for the article.
Smoke and Mirrors: Strategic Messaging and the Politics of Noncompliance
Julia C. Morse and Tyler Pratt American Political Science Review · 120(2):439–457 · DOI 10.1017/S0003055425100877
A reply can change support for punishment by changing what people believe happened or whether they think it was justified.
The question and the explanation
When a government is accused of breaking international law, other governments still have to decide whether to respond. Morse and Pratt ask how the accused government's words shape the citizens and officials who might support punishment. A punitive policy is a response intended to impose costs, such as economic restrictions or exclusion from an international body.
The authors distinguish three arguments. A denial disputes an event or responsibility: 'We did not do it.' A validity challenge rejects the rule: 'This rule should no longer govern.' An applicability claim accepts conduct but argues for an exception: 'The usual rule should not apply in these circumstances.' These are our brief illustrations, not quotations from the researchers. They matter because an audience can doubt responsibility, reject a rule, or excuse a case for different reasons.
The proposed process involves certainty and outrage. A denial may make people less sure who is responsible; an exception claim may make acknowledged conduct seem less objectionable. Either response could reduce support for punishment. A competing possibility is that an international organization can answer the argument and restore support for a response.
What the researchers compared
The main public experiment surveyed approximately 2,800 US respondents in September 2024. A separate study in November–December 2024 included 285 foreign-policy officials recruited through LinkedIn. Respondents read about an unnamed country accused of military aggression or arbitrary detention. Chance determined whether it gave no comment, denied responsibility, challenged the rule, or claimed an exception. Some respondents then received a UN reply addressing that argument.
Respondents said how strongly they supported responses such as diplomatic criticism, economic penalties, exclusion from an international institution, and material support for victimized parties. The researchers compared those answers across messages. The public sample was recruited to resemble US population characteristics. The officials were people who agreed to participate: the response rate was about 2%, 56% were US respondents, and the sample does not represent officials worldwide.
What they found and what it means
Denials and exception claims reduced US respondents' support for punishment compared with no comment. The estimate for attacking the rule was too uncertain to establish the same reduction. The officials' answers showed a broadly similar pattern, with less certain evidence for denial. The result suggests that governments can defend themselves without persuading audiences to abandon the general rule.
In these experiments, UN factual replies neutralized the reduction associated with denial. Replies to exception claims increased support for punishment but did not fully remove the reduction. Establishing who acted may resolve a factual dispute more readily than saying that the acknowledged act lacks justification. The study shows this difference in responses; it does not conclusively identify why it occurred.
Where the conclusion stops
The starting accusations contained uncertainty. These findings therefore do not show that words defeat conclusive evidence in every dispute. They also concern support for policies, rather than policies adopted or abuses stopped. Finally, persuasion is not a test of truth or legal justification: a reply can lower support for punishment while leaving its factual basis or claimed exception unresolved.
Study details and evidence anchors
Who answered?
One study surveyed US citizens; another surveyed foreign-policy officials who agreed to participate. The latter does not represent officials worldwide.
What was compared?
Chance determined the accused government's response. Some people also read a UN reply addressing it, allowing a comparison with people who saw the same claim alone.
What was measured?
Respondents said how strongly they supported particular responses to the accused government, including diplomatic criticism and economic penalties.
What remains unknown?
These answers do not show whether governments imposed those measures, whether abuses changed, or whether a claimed exception was legally justified.
Source guide: theory, public and elite experimental results, and conclusion. Free manuscript pp. 22–26 explain the design; pp. 27–35 report results. Its appendix supplies further detail.
Read first: Use the explanation here to identify the three arguments. In the full article, compare the government messages and the UN replies, then ask which decision the survey answers measure.
The publisher page is public; access to its full version may vary. A verified free author-hosted manuscript is linked.
Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners
Rachel Myrick and Jeremy M. Weinstein · International Organization 76(2):379–413 · DOI 10.1017/S0020818321000424
Can a public campaign help secure releases even when criticism alone seems unlikely to move the target? Myrick and Weinstein compare a US campaign for twenty women political prisoners with other prisoner cases, then examine interviews and media coverage. The campaign's women were released more quickly. The authors find little support for an explanation based on public shame alone; instead, they argue that publicity raised the issue's priority inside the US government and enabled private negotiations and specific incentives. The comparisons were not assigned by chance, so they require care about why particular women entered the campaign.
Try this question: If publicity helps officials inside R pursue negotiations, what dated decisions would help distinguish that explanation from Q responding directly to public criticism?
Public publisher abstract; verified free published PDF on the author’s site.
The relational politics of shame: Evidence from the universal periodic review
Rochelle Terman and Erik Voeten · The Review of International Organizations 13:1–23 · DOI 10.1007/s11558-016-9264-x
Does selective criticism make human-rights reviews ineffective? Terman and Voeten study the UN process in which governments review one another and recommend changes. Partners are treated more leniently. Yet when a partner does criticize, its recommendations are accepted more often than similar recommendations from less closely connected governments. Their explanation is that criticism can signal a problem in a relationship the target values. This evidence concerns acceptance of recommendations; agreeing to a recommendation does not establish that a government carried it out.
Try this question: Suppose R is Q's ally. Why might its criticism be less likely but more influential when it occurs, and what would you observe beyond Q accepting a recommendation?
Publisher abstract and institutional summary are free. A free full-text copy was not verified.
Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton · International Organization 62(4):689–716 · DOI 10.1017/S0020818308080247
What counts as improvement after public criticism? Hafner-Burton examines criticism and rights practices in 145 countries from 1975–2000. Governments in the spotlight can improve some practices while other abuses persist or increase. The article considers differences in their ability to reform and the possibility that they substitute one form of repression for another. This is evidence from observed countries, rather than randomly assigned criticism. It warns that a visible improvement in one practice can give an incomplete picture of people's treatment.
Try this question: If Q releases the named activists, what other detention practices would you follow before concluding that people are safer overall?
Public publisher abstract; verified free full PDF on the author’s UCSD site.
Daniel W. Drezner · Annual Review of Political Science 27:9–24 · DOI 10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-032240
Economic sanctions restrict trade, finance, or other exchanges. They can seek a policy change, limit a target's resources, or express opposition. Drezner reviews what researchers have learned about these purposes. The evidence suggests that economic pressure can be more effective than earlier accounts assumed, while harmful effects beyond the intended target are greater than once understood. Success therefore needs a stated goal: economic damage alone does not show that a government made the requested concession. The review also asks how to detect deterrence, when a threatened government avoids conduct before sanctions are imposed.
Try this question: If R restricts economic exchanges with Q, how would economic hardship differ from a policy concession or an abuse prevented?
The publisher PDF was freely retrievable during research verification. Read the abstract and conclusion first.
