The World We Make
Source companion
Created by Yoav Duman · October 2026
These are the game’s selected historical records, presented as sourced paraphrases. Follow the original source to inspect its context. The accompanying limits describe what a record cannot establish. Model outcomes and reconstructed guide dialogue are teaching material, not historical evidence.
E01 · A different public relationship
21 November 1985 · Geneva
At Geneva, Reagan and Gorbachev acknowledged major disagreements but jointly rejected nuclear war and the pursuit of military superiority. They presented preventing war as a special responsibility of their two states. This statement did not abolish their arsenals.
Can show: A publicly declared relationship and role, alongside continuing disagreement.
Cannot show: That weapons had become harmless, leaders were friends, or their audiences accepted this role.
Joint Soviet–United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in GenevaE02 · Practice beyond the summit photograph
21 November 1985 · Geneva
The same joint statement proposed regular meetings among officials and expanded cultural, educational, scientific, and other exchanges. It asked agencies to develop concrete programs. Cooperation was being organized as repeated interaction, not left at a single handshake.
Can show: An announced infrastructure for sustained contact and a possible route toward changed expectations.
Cannot show: That announced programs were all implemented or that repeated contact necessarily produces friendship.
Joint Soviet–United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in GenevaE03 · Agreement without innocence
21 November 1985 · Washington, DC
Reporting to Congress after Geneva, Reagan defended engagement while warning against illusions about the Soviet Union. He coupled arms-control proposals with continuing differences over security and political freedom. A less hostile encounter had not erased distrust or incompatible aims.
Can show: Engagement and security concerns could coexist in one government’s public position.
Cannot show: That every official or citizen shared Reagan’s interpretation, or that disagreement made negotiation impossible.
Reagan: address to Congress following the Geneva summit, 21 November 1985E04 · A setback is part of the history
11–12 October 1986 · Reykjavík
The Reykjavík summit ended without an arms-control agreement. In his subsequent public explanation, Reagan defended continuing the Strategic Defense Initiative rather than accepting Soviet restrictions on it. This is the American president’s account of the impasse, not a neutral transcript of every exchange.
Can show: A central disagreement about strategic defense persisted after earlier diplomatic progress.
Cannot show: That conversation alone resolves security disputes, or that the public account gives unrestricted access to either leader’s motives.
Reagan: address on meetings with Gorbachev in Iceland, 13 October 1986E05 · A category of missiles becomes prohibited
8 December 1987 · Washington, DC
The INF Treaty committed the United States and Soviet Union to eliminate specified ground-launched missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. It covered the defined missile category, not every nuclear weapon, and also prohibited possessing the covered systems afterward.
Can show: A negotiated legal reclassification of weapons and a commitment to material removal.
Cannot show: That all nuclear weapons disappeared, or that a signed text alone made every obligation effective.
INF Treaty, 8 December 1987, especially Articles I–II and IX–XIIIE06 · Make the promise inspectable
8 December 1987 · Washington, DC
INF paired elimination with data exchanges, notifications, on-site inspections, and a Special Verification Commission. Specified access could turn the other state’s inspector from an intruder into an authorized treaty participant. Monitoring also supplied information about compliance.
Can show: One arrangement can have informational effects and socially recognized roles at the same time.
Cannot show: That monitoring proves deep trust or that authorized inspectors acquired unlimited access.
INF Treaty, 8 December 1987, especially Articles I–II and IX–XIIIE07 · What counts as security?
7 December 1988 · New York
Addressing the United Nations, Gorbachev placed human survival and cooperation across political systems at the center of his argument. He defended freedom of political choice and rejected force as a normal foreign-policy instrument. These were public claims about a proper international role.
Can show: A changed formulation of legitimate aims and conduct in the Soviet leader’s public argument.
Cannot show: That the speech alone changed policy everywhere or removed Soviet coercion from all contexts.
Gorbachev address to the UN General Assembly, 7 December 1988; English transcriptE08 · Ideas arrive with material changes
7 December 1988 · New York
In the same UN address, Gorbachev announced a reduction of 500,000 Soviet military personnel over the following two years, alongside substantial conventional-force reductions. The case therefore cannot be treated as a clean experiment in which every material capability stayed fixed.
Can show: Publicly announced material change accompanied the proposed change of relationship.
Cannot show: That every announced reduction had already happened on the speech date or that one cause alone explains the decision.
Gorbachev address to the UN General Assembly, 7 December 1988; English transcriptE09 · Behind the public language
27–28 December 1988 · Moscow
In a private Politburo discussion, Gorbachev acknowledged internal economic needs while resisting an explanation of Soviet concessions as merely forced retreat. Other participants debated openness, military implementation, and weakening the enemy image. Ideas, strategy, budgets, and institutional resistance appear together.
Can show: Private decision makers discussed several mechanisms, and the Soviet state was not a single undivided mind.
Cannot show: That private minutes are unfiltered truth, or that acknowledging economic pressure disproves any role for identity.
Minutes of the CPSU Politburo, 27–28 December 1988; RGANI document, translated by Vladislav Zubok, hosted by National Security ArchiveE10 · Sovereignty needs recognition and arrangements
12 September 1990 · Moscow
The two German states and the four former occupying powers signed a negotiated settlement. Articles 6–7 preserved united Germany’s alliance rights and provided for full sovereignty. Article 5 imposed restrictions on foreign forces and nuclear weapons in the former East German territory. Recognized status and security arrangements changed together.
Can show: Sovereignty and international standing were enacted through a specific settlement among named parties.
Cannot show: That German society or Eastern European protesters were passive, or that this treaty alone caused the Cold War’s end.
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Articles 5–7; State Department translation reproduced by the German Historical InstituteE11 · A campaign is organized
1992–1997 · Multiple national campaigns
Six nongovernmental organizations launched the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1992. Its network linked demining, rehabilitation, human-rights, medical, veterans’, religious, and other groups. It sought both a comprehensive ban and more resources for clearance and victim assistance.
Can show: Organized nonstate actors translated concerns into coordinated demands.
Cannot show: That awareness spontaneously produced a treaty or that NGOs could sign binding treaties for governments.
Human Rights Watch, Killers in the Commonwealth, 1997, section II: campaign participant’s contemporary accountE12 · The field beyond the negotiating room
August 1993 · Cambodia and Angola: affected-country context
The ICRC identified Cambodia and Angola among places where landmines posed long-lasting danger to civilians after fighting. The relevant security question extended beyond soldiers’ immediate battlefield needs to movement, injury, livelihoods, and life after war.
Can show: A documented humanitarian problem and an expanded population whose security was at stake.
Cannot show: That an affected population held one political view, or that a general report supplies any particular survivor’s words.
ICRC, Anti-personnel Mines, International Review of the Red Cross, August 1993E13 · Turn a demand into a diplomatic route
3–5 October 1996 · Ottawa
States at the Ottawa strategy conference framed the humanitarian and socioeconomic costs of antipersonnel mines as requiring urgent action. They committed to stronger cooperation toward a ban. A coalition of governments and advocates pursued a negotiating route rather than waiting for universal agreement.
Can show: An articulated norm was connected to coordination among willing governments and nongovernmental actors.
Cannot show: That all states accepted the frame or that the coalition had authority to bind nonparticipants.
Declaration of the International Strategy Conference, Ottawa, 3–5 October 1996E14 · A ban must be implemented
18 September 1997 · Oslo
The adopted convention prohibited use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines. It also required stockpile destruction and clearance, and addressed assistance. Default deadlines run from entry into force for each state party: four years for stockpiles and ten for clearance, with clearance extensions possible.
Can show: A moral and political demand became defined obligations and implementation work.
Cannot show: That adoption equals entry into force, all landmines are covered alike, or a treaty instantly clears dangerous land.
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Oslo, 18 September 1997: treaty textE15 · Humanitarian language, a different decision
17 September 1997 · Washington, DC
Clinton announced he would not sign the emerging treaty text, citing troop protection, Korean security, transition needs, and concerns about antitank mine systems. He simultaneously supported humanitarian mine action. This is a public justification to examine, not an independent verdict that each military claim was correct.
Can show: Humanitarian identity claims and a refusal to accept this treaty coexisted; norms were contested.
Cannot show: That all military specialists agreed, or that any security justification is either automatically decisive or automatically insincere.
Clinton: remarks on international efforts to eliminate landmines, 17 September 1997; public presidential recordE16 · Recognition, signature, and unfinished work
1997–1999 · retrospective epilogue · Oslo / Ottawa
The Nobel Committee recognized the ICBL and Jody Williams on 10 October 1997. The convention opened for signature in Ottawa on 3–4 December, when 122 states signed. Entry into force followed on 1 March 1999. Recognition and signatures were achievements; they were not universal compliance or completed clearance.
Can show: Norm advocacy gained international recognition and substantial governmental commitment, through distinct events.
Cannot show: That the prize created the campaign, that every state signed, or that mine danger ended in 1997.
Norwegian Nobel Committee, Nobel Peace Prize announcement, 10 October 1997Scope and date note
Historical claims stop at the period displayed. Ottawa adoption, signature, ratification, and entry into force are different events. Present-day membership, weapons use, and treaty status are not inferred from the 1997 scenes.
The UN legal-history overview contains an opening-paragraph typo giving entry into force as 2009. The correct date is 1 March 1999, verified by the UN Treaty Collection and ICRC. Do not reproduce the typo.
UN Treaty Collection record